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INTRODUCTION: RESEARCH DISSEMINATION AND NEW 
TECHNOLOGY 
This paper aims to start a discussion on the impact of electronic publishing on the activity of research 
in economics. It is a sort of normative follow-up to my report of the 1997 ASSA session on electronic 
publication in CHEER (vol 11 #1:32-33). There as an observer I tried to report what is actually 
happening; here, as a consumer and producer, I’d like to suggest what ought to happen.  
A FEW TECHNICAL PRELIMINARIES 
In the sense which economists hold dear, namely the marginal cost of a bit more more stuff, web 
dissemination is virtually costless.  Yet the actual business of producting, reviewing, selecting, and 
disseminating research articles, particularly for journals and above all for economics journals, is not 
exploiting the technical possibilities as once expected. Evidently the simple economics of publication 
do not furnish the principal constraints on the journal business, which leads us to ask what these 
constraints really are.  
The ASSA contribution from Wayne Marr of Social Science Electronic Publishing traced the history of 
attempts to adapt the publication process to the web. The surprising outcome is that the internet has 
not - so far - imposed any fundamental change in the visible form of the principal means of scholarly 
dissemination,  namely  the  journal  article.  Though  from  the  early  hype  it  might  easily  have  been 
concluded that the web had sounded the death knell of the journal forma,  instead, the adaptations 
now emerging suggest that the journal is migrating to the electronic medium.  
Indeed  the  web  page  itself  does  not  seem  to  migrate  several  essential  functions  of  economic 
scholarship. This is surprising because the physics community evolved it precisely to overcome the 
limitations of printed dissemination. First off, therefore, let us take a look at some of the technical 
considerations involved. 
INTERACTS AND ACROBATS 
The  two  main  innovations  which  computerised  storage  and  presentation  have  brought,  namely 
interactivity  and  hyperlinking,  don’t  seem  to  migrate  to  scholarly  dissemination.  They  are  useful 
educational aids, but where the prime function is to communicate and collectivise research results, they 
don’t work.  
Interactivity is a useful educational device, and might at some later time reduce the labour-time of 
reading, but doesn’t seem to add much to the straightforward business of telling other researchers what 
you’ve found and letting them confirm it. One important exception emerged in the ASSA discussion, 
namely  the  communication  of  bulk  data.  A  web  publication  can  make  raw  data,  and  calculations 
themselves, available to other researchers so that they can then find out how the publication’s results 
were  reached.  My  personal  view  is  that  this  should  in  short  order  be  made  a  pre-requisite  to 
publication,  a  step  which  would  probably  effect  a  notable  reduction  in  the  volume  of  text  in 
circulation. 
However the strangest conclusion from the ASSA session, borne out by many experiences, is that the 
HTML form itself is inadequate to scholarly dissemination. The reason seems to be that the journal 
article,  like  the  book,  is  an  inherently  page-formatted  means  of  reproduction.  This  has  led  to 
widespread recourse to Adobe Acrobat instead of hypertext as preferred means of journal storage.     Alan Freeman 
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Acrobat  is  a  page-description  language  in  the  strict  sense,  whereas  the  words  ‘web  page’  are  a 
misnomer because there is no restriction on the length of a page, which in any case varies with the 
browser and the reader’s viewing choices. Acrobat pages, on the contrary, are shown on the screen as 
originally printed. They may be simple photographs of the page as with JSTOR’s electronic archive of 
early AEA publications, or they may be a standard page-formatted representation of the distributed 
text. The crucial point is that the reader is not free to change the format. Acrobat is therefore a 
standard independent of viewing choices. 
The re-birth of a system originally designed for the print medium is surprising because one might think 
the only reason to divide an article into printed pages is in order to print it. If it isn’t on paper, what is 
the page for? Here we begin, I think, to get a clue to what is going on. When scholars communicate 
with one another, the page is a means of location, an indexing device; as such it suceeds because it is 
universal. No matter what the form of the text, whether with headings or no headings, diagrams or no 
diagrams, footnotes or no footnotes, tables or no tables, it can always be divided into measurable 
chunks defined by the visual space which it occupies. 
Geeks might object that this is superseded by more modern devices. For example, we could directly 
refer to any part of a text we chose, if authors adopted the universal convention of incorporating 
hyperlink targets in their text for citation purposes. Oh really? The social and institutional changes 
needed to make this practice universal - even with automatic aids - are staggering. But they would also 
be retrogressive, because it is not the author’s prerogative to define what can be cited. Once in the 
public domain, the choice of what to cite is the public’s. And the most universal public standard 
presently available is a visual, or more precisely spatial reference: namely a point on a page. 
LINKING AND THINKING 
This brings us to hyperlinking, arguably destined to transform the business of citation and reference. 
Again, though this is still waiting in the wings as a possibly viable accessory, its early promise has 
evaporated. 
It is worth rehearsing what this promise consists of. If authors could include not just publication details 
of cited articles but links to them, they would transform the business of reading. As readers we could 
instantly find out whether the author has fairly represented any previous writers referred to, assess 
which parts of her or his work were original, and by back-linking trace the historical chain of its 
evolution. It may not be long before some enterprising person constructs a robot for this purpose. 
This might be uncomfortable for the author, but it is hard to doubt its value to the reader, and it would 
certainly raise the quality of the product.  
Nevertheless, for reasons I think far from spurious, hyperlinking doesn’t work.  Bluntly, the links don’t 
stay still. Half the work of maintaining a decent web site is that the references keep moving. The 
average halflife of a hyperlink in contemporary cyberspace seems to be about forty days, as far as I can 
see.  
AUTHENTICATION: AN INSTITUTIONAL QUESTION 
My principal point is that this is not just a technical question. The underlying institutional cause is that 
the  referenced  items  themselves  are  privately  maintained.  One  might  think,  for  example,  that  the 
easiest way to cite Black and Scholes’ celebrated formula is a link to the website of either Professor 
Black or Professor Scholes. But neither is under any institutional obligation to keep the document on 
the same URL, or indeed - as pointed out in the ASSA discussion - to maintain the integrity of the text. 
The obstacle which electronic production presents to research activity is precisely its greatest strength, 
namely it is an immensely fluid medium. It is the easiest thing in the world to generate endless drafts 
and versions of the same document, and this is the author’s right. But the requirements of scholarship 
conflict with this right, because the consumers - other scholars - must all referr to the same text, the 
same object. Otherwise there can be no effective principle of independent verification.     Alan Freeman 
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It might be thought that this is solved by libraries or their electronic equivalent, the electronic resource 
providers,  and  I  suspect  that  the  eventual  solution  will  be  a  modified  library  principle.  But  these 
themselves cannot easily be constrained to maintain materials in a hyperlinkable form. A library can be 
thought of as a self-regulating document resource. It provides a means of finding scholarly objects. 
But,  precisely  because  its  business  is  provision,  it  must  have  the  right  to  organise  its  method  of 
provision.    If  we  demanded  that  electronic  resource  providers  always  place  their  materials  in  an 
electronic location that was in some sense ‘logically permanent’, so that the links would always work, 
we would be asking for the equivalent of requiring libraries never to reshelve their books. 
There may be a technical solution to this; a sort of universal document naming system maintained by 
something like the INTERNIC, so that even when moved around logically (reshelved) any document 
can always be located. Perhaps this is the way things will go. But in addition to a naming standard, it 
also requires some means of verifying that the named object has not changed. Someone, somewhere, 
has to be assigned the task of the ‘curator of the objects’. This cannot be the same person as the 
document originator. Things are not therefore so easy. 
Moreover, why wait? Such a system exists now: it is called ‘ISSN’. The printed medium is a reliable 
authentication device for the simple reason that it is hard to alter, so that no special institution is 
needed. Disseminating the printed word is in itself an authentication device, as pointed out in the 
ASSA discussion. A researcher can with great confidence refer to ‘the’ seminal article on relativity by 
Einstein  precisely because it is stored in a large number of libraries and private bookshelves, and 
therefore hard to tamper with. 
A COMMERCIAL DIGRESSION 
A great fear in the journal community, particularly among publishers, is that electronic dissemination 
spells commercial disaster. The resulting extension of copyright law has divorced it from its original 
intention,  which  was  to  protect  the  rights  of  the  author.  Like  any  system  of  private  ownership, 
intellectual ownership has the function of alienating, of rendering the fruit of mental work a vendible 
substance, to be disposed of by others than the owner of the brain it came from - whether publishers, 
editors, heirs, or antiquaries. In consequence when an article is under consideration for a journal it is in 
its least accessible form, since every author knows that once an article is in the public domain, no 
commercial journal will consider it. 
This is in evident conflict with the requirements of scholarship. First, it lowers quality. It is precisely at 
the moment when an article is being considered for the ‘seal of approval’ of publication in a recognised 
forum, that an input from the community of scholars would be most useful. Second, it interferes with 
the vital scholarly requirement of early dissemination. Two- and three-year waits for the results of 
research are not a spur to it.  
TEARS, FEARS AND COMPETITION 
Technology is here playing a corrosive role. Like judges, producers are discovering a further virtue of 
the internet over and above universality, namely speed.  The Social Science Research Network model, 
based on relatively unselective but instant dissemination, succeeds precisely because it provides rapid 
access to new research, which is why it is not junk; it fulfils a necessary scholarly requirement which the 
standard dissemination process impedes. It is moreover striking that the first web application which 
the quality journals are offering their readers is pre-publication access to accepted articles. This is a 
response to an evident and reasonable demand: scholars want to see the  damned things, and the 
quicker the better. 
However I find the commercial reasoning behind the copyright reaction also suspect. Technology may 
yet combine with demand for rapid access to strand over-zealous copyright-holders. Beached whales 
should not be surprised if few tears are shed for them.     Alan Freeman 
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Restraint on pre-publication dissemination contrasts with the new practice of software companies who 
now regularly distribute thousands of ‘beta’ products almost free, before final versions are produced, 
so that the community of users can find as many problems as possible. But this process also puts the 
new ideas, albeit in raw form, in the hands of this wider community in its earliest usable form. I don’t 
see why the same principle cannot extend to research hypotheses. 
Moreover  tears  and  fears  alike  are  probably  as  premature  as  announcements  of  the  death  of  the 
journal. We can get a clue to what might happen from the answer given by Reni Schultz, editor of the 
Journal of Finance, to the frequently asked question “The referee is an idiot: what shall I do?” His 
practical instructions for appeal include an equally practical request for $150. This is nothing new: 
submission fees (and reviewers’ fees) are widespread in mainstream journals. But if material costs fall to 
(marginally) zero, then the process will be reduced to its essentials, namely reviewing and assessing with 
a view to selecting. This is a mental labour process, and an expensive one, and I suspect a section of 
the journal market will find a quite adequate source of revenue by recognising that the true consumers 
are probably the people who want their articles in print. 
A second clue comes from the ASSA session chair’s description of  Wayne Marr of the SSRN who was 
introduced,  if  memory  serves,  as  ‘a  successful  example  of  the  modern  breed  of  intellectual 
entrepreneur’. The cost of access to an SSRN journal is not on the whole large—perhaps $10-$20. This 
very cheapness is the basis for a new mass market. The JFQE might (or might not) have trouble with a 
$10 subscription on its  present distribution base because I suspect it is consumed via libraries. But if 
consumption were extended electronically to the individuals that presently used the libraries, a very 
different commercial base would emerge. 
As competition remorselessly grinds out the merely incidental, I suspect the migration process will 
probably establish a different rigime. At the end of the day, why should Professor Joe and Professora 
Jane Doe subscribe to the JFQE instead of Rupert Murdoch? Since we buy our hamburgers from 
McDonalds, why not our journals? At $20 for a swatch of journals, access is no longer commercially 
restricted to certified scholars. I can see absolutely nothing wrong in the renaissance ideal of universal 
scholarship, and anything that makes the results cheaper and more accessible is not only going to 
extend the commercial market and therefore the income base of the entire profession, but will - if we 
Do The Right Thing - subject that profession to a constraint too long lacking, namely, the informed 
criticism of the general public.  
Which brings us neatly to our main point: the vexed question of quality. 
POLICY QUESTIONS 
It  seems  not  unreasonable  to  suppose  that  the  journal  as  a  medium  offers  a  number  of  features 
decisive to scholarly activity, which the web will not rapidly overcome. In particular it offers two 
essential prerequisites of scholarly activity: 
a)  Instititionally reliable authentication 
b) Universal indexation 
 
To rehearse the reason these are essential to scholarly activity : they supply objectivity of the studied 
object, a pompous term I just invented to say we can verify that we are all talking about the same thing, 
at least as far as each others’ published ideas are concerned. If the only function of a journal was to 
disseminate, that would be the end of it. However, it isn’t. Paul Malatesta of the Journal of Financial 
and Quantitative Economics listed four functions of the traditional journal:  
a)  Archiving 
b) Dissemination  
c)  Authentication 
d) Refereeing Services     Alan Freeman 
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The  net  is  eroding  the  first  two  functions.  What  of  the  third  and  fourth?  In  my  view,  the  most 
important consequence of the ‘publishing revolution’ is its impact on the actual process of journal 
production, from which the technical change is, as it were, peeling away successive layers of merely 
material production (printing, mailing, etc) to reveal the intellectual production process underneath. 
THE MEANING OF QUALITY 
The meaning which Reni Schultz attached to authentication, if I heard him right, was more extensive 
than textual integrity. What he meant was a guarantee of quality. By consuming a journal, the reader 
can limit the scope of reading to the essential. A journal is a human search engine. 
Two functions appear to coincide. On the one hand, the sheer size and availability of the internet 
creates the well-known phenomenon of information overload. The proliferation of netcasting, search 
engines, gateways and the like are the proof that what every modern surfer needs is a method of hitting 
the big waves: a selection process. On the other hand, the journals offer their selection procedures as 
the answer to the surfers’ prayer. Quality is becoming identified with selection. 
The problem is now straightforward: there is not one single standard of quality, but four: 
a)  the requirement of the originator 
b) the requirements of the referees and editors 
c)  the requirements of the readers 
d) the requirements of science 
 
These may turn out to be the same but there is no reason a priori to suppose that they will be. At 
present, I would argue that they certainly are not. 
THE EDITORIAL PROCESS: A PROCESS OF SELECTION OR A PROCESS OF REJECTION? 
A journal is on the face of it nothing more than a collection of related materials gathered together for 
the purpose of indexation and distribution. But as dissemination becomes virtually costless, there are 
no space constraints to consider; moreover automatic indexation, search engines and gateways remove 
the need to gather like articles in one physical location. If copyright is set aside, a journal in its essential 
form is no more than a timely anthology. The wan light of twenty-first century technology is melting 
away the excuses for current practice, leaving a question hanging like an icicle in an early thaw:  what 
are editors, reviewers and publishers for? 
Ostensibly they have two jobs: to help authors make a good product, and help readers choose it. In 
practice, if we study the actual labour process of reviewing and editing a journal article, we find its 
function is selection.  In the context of the printed medium this has specific and restricted, though tacit 
meaning. Paper publishing leads to a single product and therefore a single decision: in or out. As 
Spinoza informs us, determination is negation, and a journal is defined not by what it puts in, but by 
what it leaves out. Rejection is the principal form in which the selection principle operates in the 
journal format. Quality is defined in practice negatively, not by what appears but by what does not. 
This principle is no longer technically justified. If the purpose of selection is to assist the reader in 
rapid  access,  and  if  the  cost  of  reproduction  is  marginally  zero,  then  there  is  no  commercial  or 
technical reason to deprive the reader of access to work that has not been selected. The act of selection 
should be a mere act of indexation along with many others. Indeed printed journals of high quality 
already  provide  an  indexation  service  without  judgment  of  quality,  for  example  the  Journal  of 
Economic Literature. Any journal could discharge all functions listed above without preventing authors 
from disseminating, or readers from finding, material other than that awarded seals of approval.  
Indeed electronic distribution opens up a much wider range of possibilities than mere binary choice; 
for  example  a  range  or  gradation  of  materials,  multi-dimensional  ratings  applying  a  number  of 
independent criteria  (accessibility,  relevance,  originality, consistency,  etc)  or  even,  heaven  forbid,  a     Alan Freeman 
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range of reviewer evaluations. To put it another way, there is no sound reason for a primary focus on 
rejection. If rejection persists, therefore, it must stem from some motive other than the preservation of 
quality. 
QUIS CUSTODIET IPSUS CUSTODES? 
The recent situation where (yet another) Nobel Prize has been awarded to authors of a rejected piece is 
only another nail in the coffin of an idea for which I can find no serious empirical evidence: the notion 
that the editorial and reviewing process of the contemporary economics journal plays any significant 
role in guaranteeing objectively-ascertainable quality. 
Certainly there is no a priori reason to suppose that mere acts of rejection constitute guarantees of 
quality, or we would have to cast the Spanish Inquisition as the most scrupulous editorial board in 
history. Yet so far, migration to the electronic format has produced no significant modification of the 
rejection principle among the established journals. What, then, is its actual function? It would be an 
exaggeration to accuse economics of illiberalism. More schools of economic thought flourish than 
angels on a mediaeval pin. Nor can it be accused of lacking procedures to verify their output. 
The basic point is that economics, in contrast with most other sciences, is almost entirely free of the 
annoying encumbrance of independent scrutiny. An unqualified person can check a medical result: they 
can see if the patient dies.  We can see if houses stands up, planes fly, or clothing stays intact, and judge 
- at least indirectly - the theories of the physicists, chemists and biologists upon which these miracles 
depend. We can even point telescopes at the skies to check out the astronomers, as Galileo maintained 
to his cost.  
But economics is loud to the point of stridency in its insistence that the only people competent to 
judge economists are other economists. It has an internal process of confrontation and selection, it is 
said, which will cast out the bad and elevate the good. That it has an internal process of selection, and 
that it involves much conflict, is beyond doubt. So do religions. The problem is, what guarantee can we 
offer that the governing law of this process replaces bad with good? Indeed, the quite rapid alternation 
of rival schools of thought in economics must lead to the opposite conclusion. If Keynes was wrong, 
how did the profession come to adopt his views? If right, how did it abandon him? 
GRESHAM’S LAW OF PUBLICATION 
Since ideas proliferate in economics, and since there is competition between them, it is fruitful to 
examine how this competition is organised. 
THE JOURNAL AS UNIT OF CLASSIFICATION 
A clue is offered by the instructions to reviewers and authors of most economics journals. The most 
striking fact is the near-total absence of objective criteria. The writer is abjured to submit so many 
words, double-space the copy, abstain from mathematics, to be clear, and so on. But these purely 
technical requirements have no bearing on the content of the work. Every author knows that the most 
accurate definition of what an economics submission should contain, is that it should appeal to the 
reviewers. Perhaps in addition it should cite and relate to recently-published work, particularly work 
likely to bear reviewers’ names. In other words the principal criteria - if for no other reason than the 
lack of objective alternatives - are in practice subjective. What we can be assured of, when we read a 
journal,  is  the  most  coherent  and  forceful  presentation  of  the  general  opinions  of  its  editors  and 
reviewers, and an exploration of their conclusions.  
There is no independent guarantee that either the articles or the opinions have any other desirable 
qualities. Each journal presents to its readership, generally quite accurately, the fruits of the theoretical 
schools of opinion which find favour with its editors and reviewers. Insofar as dissent is presented, 
journals do not exactly open their pages to their most forthright and effective opponents. They stage     Alan Freeman 
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the debates they like to have; that is to say, they arrogate to themselves the luxury of choosing their 
own critics. 
Thus the actual role of the present journal is classification. This is the only coherent basis for the 
rejection principle. It is because the function of a journal is to define which material conforms to 
definite schools of thought that it has to reject material that does not conform. This is not at all 
confined to mainstream journals. The general practice in economics, for anyone with a distinctive view, 
is either to establish a journal which represents that view or to take over one that already exists. The 
model of confrontation of ideas in economics is by and large a model of a conflict of schools of 
thought, organised by platforms. This is even advocated; the competitive process between schools, it is 
argued, is in itself the best guarantee of scientific merit. At the level of the winners, however the line is 
blurred and competitive success is defined as legitimate authority: in short, proof of success. 
THE COMPETITIVE SELECTION PRINCIPLE IN ECONOMICS 
But the outcome of any competitive process depends on the selection principle which elevates one 
above another. Socrates was forced to drink hemlock; however this competitive failure is not generally 
accepted as evidence against the quality of his views. We thus return to our original four conflicting 
selection criteria. Does the competitive selection principle in economics conform to the requirements 
of the readers, the authors, the editors or the truth? 
Truth does not seem to play a particularly decisive role. Lant Pritchett (1997:14), a senior World Bank 
economist, recently concluded that convergence does not happen. Since 1870 the gap between a small 
group of rich countries and a much larger group of poor countries, has systematically widened. As for 
recent policy, in the author’s words: 
“From 1980-1994, growth per capita GDP averaged 1.5 per cent in the advanced countries and 0.34 
percent  in  the  less  developed  countries.  There  has  been  no  acceleration  of  growth  in  most  poor 
countries, either absolutely or relatively, and there is no obvious reversal in divergence...taken together, 
these findings imply that almost nothing that is true about the growth rates of advanced countries is 
true of the developing countries, either individually or on average.” 
The data used to draw this conclusion has been available for at least fifteen years. Convergence is either 
a stated assertion, or a theoretical conclusion, of most modern mainstream theory. The policy advice 
given to most of the world for the last fifteen years is based on this notion, or at least makes no sense 
without it. Whatever principle of selection promoted these ideas, it was clearly not conformity to the 
observable facts. 
Moreover, economic theory itself predicts a different outcome. The competitive process in economics, 
like any other governed by money, elevates the suppliers of products who meet the requirements of the 
suppliers of money. The largest market for economics, above all its policy output, is provided by banks 
and  governments;  a  second  distinctive  feature  of  economics  in  comparison  with  other  sciences. 
Economists as policy advisors are not in general hired, as are scientists, to furnish objectively optimal 
or independently-verifiable results but to implement and rationalise exogenous policy goals defined by 
private or political interests. There is no reason to suppose that either a bank or a government will pay 
large amounts of money for advice it does not want. The theories elevated by this competitive process 
are therefore the theories that best suit prevailing pecuniary interests. 
A USER-CENTRED VIEW 
The web offers an alternative dissemination model because it removes the technical basis for the 
rejection principle. In the first place this means that if the principle is maintained, then it needs a fresh 
justification. But in the second place it suggests there is a great deal of space for creative innovation 
between the two poles now established, namely instant but unrestrictive publication on the one hand, 
and a mere electronic reproduction of existing practice on the others. This opens up several questions 
of which I want to focus on two:     Alan Freeman 
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￿  (1)  are there genuinely objective guarantees of quality? 
￿  (2)  could alternative dissemination models overcome the defects of the present system? 
 
In my view the two questions are entirely linked. The defect of the present  
dissemination model is that despite the apparent liberalism of the profession,  
￿  (a)  it denies the public the opportunity of independent verification; 
(b)  it operates to impose conformity; 
(c)  the conformity it imposes is determined by pecuniary or political interests. 
 
I start from the unusual hypothesis that it is probably impossible to transcend the influence of private 
and political interest. Objective truth in economics is therefore unattainable by the profession itself: it 
cannot deliver a uniform view that simultaneously pays its bills and meets the requirements of science.  
This does not mean that no truth can be found in economics; just that the internal mechanisms of the 
economics profession will not in general promote it.  Positive economics is a logical contradiction in 
se. 
Viewed in this light, the most important step is to abandon the pretence of authority. If economics 
ceased pretending to purvey objective truth, and contented itself with the status something like the 
liberal arts, this would probably benefit the general public and would by no means damage economics. 
This does not mean abandoning the notion of economic science: merely the pretence that the existing 
profession does it. The principle of economic dissemination which I would suggest is therefore that of 
independent verification, underlying which is the heretical idea that the public might be a better judge 
of economics than the economists, if only the economists recognised their job as helping the public to 
decide for itself instead of deciding on their behalf.  
The objective of dissemination would then be, in every way possible, to facilitate public access to the 
decision-making and discussion processes of economics. 
In the first place this demands universal pluralism; The function of dissemination is to furnish the 
general public with all views relevant to the matters it seeks to study. This does not conflict with a 
review process that selects for quality, nor with a review process that classifies by point of view.  It 
conflicts only with the rejection of material on the basis of whether or not the reviewers agree with it, 
and in general with the use of rejection as a classificatory device. 
In the second place it demands critical engagement; the place for debates is not in the contest between 
journals but in the discussion within each one. Instead of rejecting material that does not conform to 
editorial predilections, the onus would be on contributors to address the views they don’t agree with. 
Otherwise, it cannot be said that they have given a rounded consideration to the question they are 
trying to study, and most importantly, the readership is denied access to the alternatives. Right of 
response is a further safeguard in this same framework. 
Far from signifying the end of quality control, this dissemination model imposes standards of quality 
which may be substantially higher than those at present in operation. It suggests, for example, criteria 
such as the following: 
DEMONSTRATION BY EVIDENCE, NOT AUTHORITY  
‘As noted by Fama and French’ is not a proof that something is true; but a piece of information that 
Fama and French said the same thing first. If substituted for evidence, it is an ipse dixit demonstration; 
one which asks the reader to accept the views of an authority as proof of truth. 
CORRECT ATTRIBUTION IN INDIRECT CITATION 
‘Keynesian theory defines equilibrium in the goods and money markets as the intersection of the IS 
and LM curves’ is false. This is Hick’s presentation of Keynes’s theory. ‘In Marx’s theory value is given     Alan Freeman 
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by vertically-integrated labour coefficients’ is false. This is the interpretation of Marx’s theory proposed 
by  Linear  Production  Theory.  Unless  the  reader  can  distinguish  the  real  source  of  a  theoretical 
assertion, it is impossible for her or him either to trace the assumptions that genuinely lie behind it, or 
to make an informed judgement on the author to whom the theory is attributed. 
RULES OF EVIDENCE IN INDIRECT CITATION 
The rules of evidence apply not just to economic facts but economic theories. If the claim is made that 
an author said something or a theory claims something, then the reader must be able to find where it is 
said, and the author must produce substantive evidence that the attributed interpretation is consistent 
with the cited text. 
SPECIFICATION OF THE IMPLICIT BASIS FOR FACTUAL CLAIMS 
‘Real UK output in 1994 was £570,722’ is a false claim. ‘Output as measured by the UK NIAs, deflated 
using the GDP deflator, was £570,722’ specifies the theoretical framework that produced the claim, 
permits the reader to trace the assertion back to its source, and allows the reader to judge how the 
conclusions of the paper would change if a different, alternative measure of output were used. 
In addition to these specifically ‘critical pluralist’ requirements, there are perfectly sensible and un-
objectionable criteria which would apply in any dissemination model but are rarely made explicit, eg: 
TRANSPARENCY 
The expertise assumed should be the minimum necessary to the argument. Whilst we cannot impose 
the principle that an unqualified person can immediately understand an economic argument, we can 
first of all take general responsibility for providing them with the means to do so, and second abandon 
the pretence that our expertise necessarily conveys any superior claim to truth. 
ORIGINALITY 
It is reasonable to inform the reader that work which merely repeats earlier conclusions or arguments 
has lower relevance than the original, exception being made of review or summary articles 
RELEVANCE TO ANNOUNCED TOPIC 
Journals have every right to specialise: but specialisation is primarily a question of field of interest, not 
theoretical framework.  
CONCLUSION 
Is there any reasonable prospect that such a dissemination model could take root? I think that it will be 
earnestly resisted. However, precisely because of the dramatic changes in the technical environment, it 
is for the first time a practical possibility and there is room for creative experimentation. Whether the 
practical migrates to the actual, is a matter for human will and commitment; the competitive selection 
principles that operate in a cost-free environment, however, are likely to pose a substantively greater 
challenge to orthodoxy than has been seen in the past. The evidence from the general public discontent 
with economics, and from the drive from within the profession for new modes of scholarship, suggests 
that the old habits have no reason to expect an unchallenged ride into the Twenty-First Century. 
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NOTES 
1:  ‘Stuff’, as defined by the Iomega corporation, means ‘anything stored on an electronic medium’. 
2: Needless to say, like judges they are also finding the product doesn’t always live up to the protoype. 